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Abstract
We develop a dynamic industry model where financing frictions aﬀect the
entry decisions of new firms in the home market, as well as the riskiness of oper-
ating firms. These two factors in turn determine a joint endogenous distribution
of firms across productivity, volatility and financial wealth. We show that this
endogenous distribution is crucial to understand export and productivity dynam-
ics after a trade liberalization. In particular, the calibrated model predicts that
financing frictions have an ambiguous eﬀect on the number of firms starting to
export. They reduce the ability of firms to finance the fixed costs necessary to
start exporting, but they also change the distribution of domestic firms so that
most of them find more profitable to access foreign markets. More importantly,
the model predicts that financing constraints, even when they have a negligible
net eﬀect on the number of exporting firms, reduce the aggregate productivity
gains induced by trade liberalization by 30% to 50%, because they distort the
selection into export of the most productive firms. In the second part of the
paper we verify the main predictions of the model with a rich dataset of Italian
manufacturing firms for the period 1995-2003.
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1 Introduction
Becoming an exporter is an important decision for a firm. The literature on firms with
heterogeneous productivity following Melitz (2003) emphasizes that this decision can
be modelled as an investment decision, where the fixed costs of becoming an exporter
have to be compared with the expected gains of accessing foreign markets for products.
This view of the decision to export has proved quite successful empirically. At the same
time, the eﬀect of financing constraints on firm investment has been a recurrent topic
in corporate finance. However the number of contributions that explore the decision to
export in the presence of financing constraints is quite limited and generally restricted
to static models. This paper intends to cover this gap by developing a dynamic industry
model with heterogeneous firms where financing frictions and bankruptcy risk aﬀect
export dynamics both directly and indirectly, because they shape the selection into
entry into the home market and therefore determine the cross sectional distribution
of productivity and of risk of the domestic firms. Furthermore, this paper verifies
empirically the predictions of the model with a large panel of Italian manufacturing
firms for the period 1995-2003.
The theoretical part of the paper combines in a novel way three recent strands
of literature. The trade literature that studies export dynamics with heterogeneous
firms (following Melitz, 2003); the investment literature which has shown that firm
investment decisions, and especially the timing of large fixed investments, are aﬀected
by the presence of borrowing constraints (see for example Whited, 2006); and the
firm dynamics literature, which has recently emphasized the contribution of inter-firm
reallocation on industry productivity and growth (see for example Hsieh and Klenow,
2009).
Even though this is not the first theoretical paper to embed financing constraints
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into the Melitz model, one important novel element of our paper is the introduction
of firm dynamics and costly bankruptcy.1 The main eﬀects of financing frictions in
the model are illustrated in figure 1, which shows that financing frictions aﬀect export
decisions directly, because they prevent firms not having enough internal funds from
paying the large fixed costs necessary to starting to export, but also indirectly, by
aﬀecting the selection into entry in the home market and the riskiness of operating
firms. These two factors in turns determine a joint endogenous distribution of firms
across productivity, volatility and financial wealth. This endogenous distribution is
important to understand both firm level export decisions and their consequences for
aggregate productivity after a trade liberalization.
The main empirical contribution of the paper is to test the predictions of the model.
1See the next section for a review of the recent related literature.
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To do so, we use self declared financing constraints and instrumental variables to avoid
the endogeneity problems that arise from the codetermination of productivity and
financing constraints.
In the model we consider firms that are heterogenous in their productivity and are
subject to idiosyncratic shocks. They also face financing imperfections which limit
their external financing, and therefore need to use internal funds to finance certain
investment costs which are essential for their activity. As a consequence, if their liquid
wealth is low, they may go bankrupt and be forced to liquidate their business after
a negative shock, even though it would have been profitable to continue. Financing
constraints and bankruptcy risk aﬀect the distribution of firms in three diﬀerent ways:
first, they alter the entry decision of firms inducing a positive correlation between
risk and return; second, bankruptcy aﬀects the survival of firms, changing the pool
of producers and the nature of competition; third, financing constraints aﬀect directly
the decision of becoming an exporter.
Firms can start exporting after paying a fixed cost. In the presence of financing
constraints this fixed cost drains some liquid wealth and increases the risk of bank-
ruptcy. In the absence of financing frictions, we obtain the standard result in Melitz
(2003): only firms with productivity above a certain threshold are willing to start ex-
porting, because the net present value of the profits from the exports is larger than the
fixed cost involved in becoming an exporter. Therefore trade liberalization increases
productivity because the most productive firms expand their activity by entering the
export market, and because the increase in competition from foreign imports will push
out of production the least productive ones.
Instead we show that in a calibrated industry aﬀected by financing frictions (both
in the home and in the foreign country), the productivity gains induced by trade lib-
eralization are much smaller not because fewer firms export, but because the selection
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into export is distorted by the presence of financing frictions. More specifically, financ-
ing frictions have two important eﬀects on industry dynamics and on the outcome of
a trade liberalization.
First, the survival pattern of firms aﬀects how their earnings evolve with time:
financing frictions imply that new and young firms have some probability to default
after a negative shock. This lowers their expected profits in the short run and deters
entry. Therefore in equilibrium fewer entrants translate into a decrease in competition,
and an increase in expected profits for the firms that survive and accumulate enough
wealth to become financially unconstrained.
In other words, the age profile of expected profits in the financially constrained
industry is more upward sloping. The default risk implies lower expected profits at
young age, that are compensated by reduced competition and higher profits for the
firms that "survive" their early age and accumulate enough wealth to be covered against
future default risk. These higher profits benefit low risk firms, which face little default
risk when young, because their income process is not very volatile. Therefore some
low risk/low productivity firms which would not start production in a perfect markets
industry, find it profitable both to start production and to start exporting after a trade
liberalization in an industry with financing frictions.
Second, the presence of financial frictions generates a risk vs. return trade oﬀ that
aﬀects the selection of firms into entry: firms learn about the riskiness of their business
at the beginning of their life. Higher risk involves a higher likelihood of experiencing
large negative shocks that lead them to bankruptcy, and a lower chance of surviving the
initial stages of their activity. Therefore new firms that operate a very risky technology
will stay in business only if their productivity is very high. Conversely, some low pro-
ductivity/low risk firms will stay in business because their lower risk also reduces their
bankruptcy probability. This endogenous correlation amplifies the eﬀect of financing
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constraints, as very productive firms are also on average riskier, and therefore more
aﬀected by financing frictions when deciding on becoming exporters. The endogenous
selection of firms into the home market implies that the most productive firms in the
industry are also on average riskier and will find it optimal to delay entering in foreign
markets until they have accumulated a suﬃcient amount of precautionary wealth.
We quantify these eﬀects by calibrating an artificial industry whose dynamics match
those of our sample of Italian manufacturing firms. We show that, with respect to a
financially unconstrained industry, the presence of financing constraints and bank-
ruptcy risk reduces the productivity gains following a trade liberalization by 30% to
50%. However, the number of firms that export in the constrained and unconstrained
industry is very similar. The diﬀerence in industry productivity is entirely due to the
worsening of the selection into home production and into export induced by financing
constraints.
In the empirical section of the paper we provide evidence of these eﬀects using a rich
dataset of Italian manufacturing firms for the period 1995-2003. This dataset contains
precise information on the trade policies of firms and on their self-declared financing
constraints. While this information on financing constraints is particularly detailed,
there is still the possibility that confounding eﬀects such as productivity shocks that
are not fully captured by the productivity measures could be driving both exports and
financing constraints. To avoid this endogeneity problem we use standard measures of
credit availability commonly used in the relationship lending literature as instrumental
variables.
Our empirical results show that: first, the distribution of productivity in the sample
is consistent with the presence of financing constraints and entry costs in the form of
initial investments. Second, financing constraints are an important determinant of the
exporting decision of the firm, and their eﬀect is quantitatively as important as other
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eﬀects identified in the literature such as size and productivity. Third, consistently
with the behavior predicted by the model, the amount of liquid assets held by the firms
around the time when they begin exporting is positively correlated with productivity
for firms that face financing frictions, while they are not correlated with productivity
for the financially unconstrained firms. Finally, we show empirically that a proxy of
the productivity of the firms becomes a worse predictor of its exporting behavior the
larger the financing constraints. For firms that are ex-ante less likely to be financially
constrained, productivity is a good predictor of their export behavior, while for firms
that are more likely to be constrained its predictive power falls.
The paper is organized as follow: Section 2 reviews the related literature; Section
3 illustrates the model; Section 4 describes the simulation results; Section 5 describes
the empirical evidence and finally Section 6 concludes.
2 Literature
The model is related to an extensive literature on firm-level export decisions started by
Melitz (2003). A sustained assumption of the models in this literature is that firms are
heterogeneous in their productivity levels and decide to become exporters by paying a
fixed initial cost. The role of financing constraints in the context of this family of mod-
els has been explored by Chaney (2005) by introducing exogenous financing constraints
as an additional source of heterogeneity across firms. In Chaney (2005) firms need cash
in advance to pay for the fixed costs of exporting and some of them are exogenously
financially constrained. Financially constrained firms never export and this, in turn,
generates reallocation eﬀects that are diﬀerent from the standard model without fi-
nancing constraints. Manova (2008) extends this framework by partially endogenizing
financing constraints. Firms are allowed to borrow a proportion of next-period’s pro-
duction. The degree of financing frictions that a firm faces is therefore modelled as the
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proportion of next year’s production that can be borrowed this year. The risk of going
bankrupt plays an important role in our model, and a related argument can be found
in Garcia Vega and Guariglia (2007), who modify the Melitz (2003) model to introduce
idiosyncratic volatility and financing constraints. More recently, models with financing
frictions and exports have been studied by Mayneris (2010) and Berman and Hericourt
(2010).
All these models nicely embed financing constraints into the standard Melitz model.
However one important novel element of our paper is the introduction of firm dynamics.
All the above papers study "static" industries, in the sense that firms are not allowed to
retain earnings and to change their capital structure in response to financing frictions.
Conversely our paper studies a fully dynamic industry where the joint distribution
of firms across productivity, volatility and wealth arises endogenously. We show that
this endogenous distribution is very important to understand both firm level export
decisions and their consequences for aggregate dynamics after a trade liberalization.
Empirically, a number of recent papers have explored the impact of financing con-
straints on exports. Manova (2008, 2010) shows how country-sector measures of fi-
nancing constraints are negatively correlated with exports. Muuls (2008), Mayneris
(2010), Berman and Hericourt (2010) and Bellone et al. (2010) study the relation
between financing constraints and export using firm level financing constraints vari-
ables. Greenaway et al. (2007) show that seasoned exporters exhibit better financial
wealth than non exporters; while this is not true about recent exporters. This result
lends support to the idea of large fixed costs associated with entering foreign markets.
Garcia-Vega and Guariglia (2007) test their model on a sample of UK firms and show
that volatility in productivity may reduce the likelihood of becoming an exporter. All
of these papers, with the exception of Manova (2007,2008) use financing constraints
measures that are constructed using balance sheet information. The advantage of these
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measures is that they use very standard information so they can be applied to large
samples. However these measures are correlated with productivity shocks and hard
to instrument. If productivity is measured with some error, the financing constraints
measures are likely to capture part of the eﬀect of productivity even in a setup where
they do not matter.
Another related paper is Minetti and Chun Zhu (2010), who use a subset of the
database of Italian firms we employ in this paper to analyze the eﬀect of financing
frictions on the intensive and extensive margins of export. Beside using a larger dataset,
our empirical analysis diﬀers from Minetti and Chun Zhu (2010) in that we test the
specific predictions of our dynamic model regarding the direct and indirect implications
of financing frictions for the distribution of wealth and for the productivity-export
relation.2
3 The Model
We consider an industry where heterogenous firms are allowed to produce at home and
to export in a foreign market. The objective of the model is to study how financing
frictions aﬀect the selection of firms into production, and to study the joint eﬀect of
these frictions and of the steady state distribution of firms on the export decisions and
productivity dynamics in the industry.
We follow Melitz (2003) and Costantini and Melitz (2007) and consider a model
where each firm in an industry produces a variety  of a consumption good. There is a
continuum of varieties  ∈ Ω Consumers preferences for the varieties in the industry
2Other papers that do not focus on financing constraints but are nonetheless related are Campa
and Shaver (2001) and Castellani (2002). Campa and Shaver (2001) show that exporting firms may
use the exposure to diﬀerent countries to diversify the risk of business cycle fluctuations. This can be
seen as a reverse causality result that shows that becoming an exporter may ease financing constraints
in the long run. Castellani (2002) studies the same database analysed in this paper, and shows that
labour productivity growth variables aﬀect the likelihood of exports. However the levels of labour
productivity do not seem to be related to the decision to export.
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are C.E.S. with elasticity   1 The C.E.S. price index  is then equal to:
 =
⎡
⎣
Z

()1−
⎤
⎦
1
1−
(1)
And the associated quantity of the aggregated diﬀerentiated good  is:
 =
∙Z

()−1
¸ −1
(2)
where () and () are the price and quantity consumed of the individual varieties
 respectively The overall demand for the diﬀerentiated good  is generated by:
 =  1− (3)
where  is an exogenous demand parameter and    is the industry price elasticity
of demand. From (2) and (3) the demand for an individual variety  is:
() =  
−

() (4)
Each variety is produced by a firm using labour (where units of labour are defined
such that wage cost =1). The productivity parameter  determines the marginal cost
of production, which is equal to 1. The profits from the domestic activity of a firm
with productivity  and variety  are given by:3
 ( ) = ()()− () −  (5)
Where   0 are the overhead fixed costs of production that have to be paid every
period. They are subject to an idiosyncratic shock  which follows an AR(1) process
with mean zero, volatility 2 and autocorrelation coeﬃcient :
 =  +  (6)
3In order to simplify the notation, in this section we refer to a generic firm, and therefore we do
not add any sub-index for firm specific parameters such as   and 
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Firms are heterogeneous in terms of productivity  and the volatility of the fixed
production cost 2 The determination of  and 2 across firms is explained in section
3.2. The shock  introduces uncertainty in profits, and it plays an important role in
the presence of financing frictions. By aﬀecting the probability of default, the shock
also aﬀects both the entry decision and the export decision of firms. The idiosyncratic
shock enters additively in  ( ) so that it does not aﬀect the firm decision on the
optimal price  and quantity produced .4 The firm is risk neutral and chooses 
after observing  in order to maximize  ( )  The first order condition yields the
standard Melitz pricing function:
 =  − 1
1
 (7)
It then follows that:
 ( ) = ( − 1)
−1
 
−−1 − 
As in Melitz (2003), firms are allowed to export. They have to pay a per unit variable
trade cost   a per period fixed cost to export   When a firms exports for the first
time it also has to pay an initial sunk cost   Assuming that we are in a symmetric
two country world, it is easy to show that profits from export are as follows:
 ( ) = ( − 1)
−1
 
−
µ 
 
¶−1
− 
 =  + 
The shock  follows an AR(1) process with mean zero, volatility 2 , autocorrelation
coeﬃcient   and it is possibly contemporaneously correlated with 
4A multiplicative shock of the type ()() would not change the qualitative results of the
model, but it would have two main consequences. First, it would imply that the optimal quantity
produced  () would be a function of the intensity of financing frictions, thus making the solution
of the problem both more complicate and less comparable to the benchmark Melitz model. Second,
it would imply that expected profits are a function of 2.
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The timing of the model for a firm which was already in operation in period −1 is
the following. At the beginning of period  its technology may become "useless" with
an exogenous probability   1 In this case the firm ends its activity and liquidates
its assets.5 With probability 1−  the firm continues activity, and its financial wealth
 is determined as follows:
 = (−1 − −1 + −1 () +−1−1 ()) (8)
where −1 is equal to one if the firm decided in period − 1 to pay the fixed cost 
in order to start exporting in period   is an indicator function that is equal to one
if the firm is an exporter in period 6
Equation (8) implies that the firm pays no dividends and that all revenues are
reinvested in the business. In other words, dividends are distributed only once the
firm stops its activity and liquidates its assets. Since we assume that the firm is risk
neutral, and that it discounts future profits at the real interest rate , the decision not
to distribute dividends is optimal when the firm faces financing frictions. When the
firm accumulates enough wealth to become financially unconstrained, it also becomes
indiﬀerent about distributing or retaining earnings. Therefore this assumption does
not limit the analysis in any important way.
At the beginning of period  the firm observes the realization of the shocks to
the fixed costs of producing and exporting  and  , which determine  ( ) and
 ( )  the profits which will be generated during this period. Financing frictions
are introduced by assuming that the firm cannot borrow to finance the fixed cost of its
operations. While it can pay workers with the stream of revenues generated by their
5This exogenous exit is necessary to calibrate an industry with a stationary distribution of firms.
6This happens when −1 = 1 and the firm decided to continue exporting or when −1 = 0
but −1 = 1 Conversely,  is equal to zero either if the firm was a domestic producer (−1 = 0)
and decided to continue only in the domestic market, or if the firm was an exporter (−1 = 1) and
decided to stop exporting (no fixed costs are associated to this decision).
12
labour input, it has to pay in advance the per period fixed costs of production:
 ≥  + +  (9)
If the constraint (9) cannot be satisfied, then the firm cannot continue its activity and
is forced to liquidate. In order to interpret this condition, it is important to remember
that  is decided in period −1 and is therefore a state variable at time  It indicates
that the firm is an exporter in the current period. Conversely,  is a choice variable
in period t Therefore, the following cases are possible:
The firm is not
currently an
exporter
( = 0)
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
 ≥  +  : the firm can continue domestic activity and could start exporting
 ≤    +  : the firm can continue domestic production but does nothave enough funds to start exporting
   : the firm is forced to liquidate
⎫
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
The firm is
currently an
exporter
( = 1)
⎧
⎨
⎩
 ≥  +  : the firm can continue domestic and foreign production
   +  : the firm is forced to liquidate
⎫
⎬
⎭
Constraint (9) is a simple way to introduce financing frictions in the model. Moreover it
generates realistic firm dynamics, and can be interpreted as a shortcut for more realistic
models of firm dynamics with financing frictions.7 The limitation of this assumption is
that it imposes that financing frictions do not aﬀect the investment in variable inputs
of the firm. However this limitation is justified by one considerable advantage: together
with the assumption of the linearity of the profits shock (see equation 6), it keeps the
model considerably easier to solve and more comparable to the basic Melitz (2003)
7For instance, Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006) derive the optimal long term bank-firm contract
under asymmetric information. They show that under the optimal contract firms are initially finan-
cially constrained. But if successful they gradually grow and become unconstrained. However, if
unsuccessful they may go bankrupt even though their projects are profitable. Moreover, they also
show that even with a i.i.d. shock to firm revenues, the model generates persistence and path de-
pendence in firm dynamics. We will show later in this section that the constraint (9) generates firm
dynamics similar to those in Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006).
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model. Moreover, to use a more realistic financing frictions assumption is not likely to
change the main results of the model. This is because, as it will be explained later,
the liquidation risk implies that firms accumulate a precautionary stock of liquid assets
before starting to export. Therefore, if we assumed that also variable production inputs
were subject to financing frictions, the production decisions of exporting firms would
not be likely to change because these precautionary assets would be large enough to
allow the self financing of all variable inputs.
3.1 Export decision
If the firm has enough resources to satisfy constraint (9), then it has to decide about the
next period’s production. In order to characterize this decision, we define  0 (  | )
as the value of the firm (defined as the net present value of the future expected profits)
conditional on+1 = 0 (no export status in period +1), and we define as  1 (  | )
the value of the firm conditional on +1 = 1.
 0 (  | ) = 1−  
£ +1 (+1 +1 | )¤ (10)
 1 (  | ) = 1−  
£ +1 (+1 +1 | )¤ (11)
In the following analysis and in the benchmark calibration we make the simplifying
assumption that the shock to home and export production are perfectly correlated:  =
 We later show that the results of the model are confirmed even if  and  are un-
correlated. The decision concerning +1 depends on the initial status. If a firm is not
currently an exporter it will start exporting if  1
¡ −   ¢−   0 ( ). Con-
versely a firm which is already exporting will keep exporting if  1 ( )   0 ( ) 
As a consequence   (  | )  the value of a firm that starts period  without an
exporter status, is:
  (  | ) = 1 ( ≥ )
© ( ) + max £ 1 ¡ −    | ¢−    0 (  | )¤ª
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and the value of a firm which start period  with an exporter status is
  (  | ) = 1
¡ ≥  +  ¢ © ( ) +  ( ) + max £ 1 (  | )   0 (  | )¤ª
The term 1 () is an indicator function which is equal to one if the financing constraint
is satisfied, and is equal to zero otherwise.
3.2 Entry decision
Every period there is free entry. New entrants start with the same initial wealth 0
and have to pay an initial cost  to "constitute the firm". This can be interpreted
as a research and development cost to determine the characteristics of the product the
firm will produce and sell. After paying this cost, the firm observes its type (  2)
which is drawn from an initial distribution. At this point, the firm decides whether to
pay a fixed cost  to start the actual production process. We assume, for simplicity,
that the firm always starts production in the home country only. The firm will decide
to start production if the product is profitable:
  ¡0  | 2¢−   0 (12)
The free entry condition requires that ex ante the expected value of paying  and
constituting a firm is zero. Assuming that  is uniformly distributed among the set of
discrete values {1  }  and 2 is uniformly distributed among the set of discrete
values
©21   2ª  and that the two distributions are independent, the free entry
condition can be written as follows:
X
=1
X
=1
max
©  ¡0  | 2¢−  0ª
 − 
 = 0 (13)
The choice of distinguishing between two diﬀerent types of initial fixed costs is new
(to our knowledge) in this literature, and it requires some explanation. Beside being
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realistic to distinguish between the startup costs to define the product and the costs
to actually start producing it, this definition allows to analyze the selection role of
financing imperfections. The pre-entry cost  is the one that determines the amount
of potential entrants, while  determines the characteristics of entrants. We show
that given a draw of  and 2 the value of entering the market   (0  | 2) decreases
in 2 in the presence of financing frictions, because the higher is 2 the more volatile
are profits, and the higher is the risk that the firm will hit a binding constraint (9)
and be liquidated. Since   (0  | 2) also increases in  it follows that financing
frictions generate an endogenous positive correlation between idiosyncratic risk and
productivity. This positive correlation, of which we find strong evidence in the data,
has important consequences for the eﬀect of financing frictions on export dynamics, as
it will be shown below.
3.3 Industry equilibrium
We consider a steady state industry equilibrium where the aggregate price  the
aggregate quantity  and the distribution of firms over the values of   and 2
are constant over time. The presence of the exogenous exit probability  ensures
that the distribution of wealth across firms is non-degenerate. Aggregate price  is
set to ensure that the free entry condition (13) is satisfied. The number of firms in
equilibrium ensures that  also satisfies the aggregate price equation (1). Aggregation
is very simple because, as in Melitz (2003), all operating firms with productivity 
choose the same price  ()  as determined by (7).
4 Model’s solution and calibration
The solution of the model is obtained using a numerical method (see Appendix I for
a description). The time period is one year, and the benchmark parameters are as
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follows: the aggregate productivity termmatches the number of firms in the empirical
dataset analyzed in the next section. The exit probability  is set to 0.04, matching the
average exit rate of firms observed in the empirical data. The real interest rate  is set
equal to 2%. Following Constantini and Melitz (2007) the fixed costs  is calibrated
so that firms on average devote 20% of their labour cost to overhead.  is set equal
to 
The technological parameters  2 and  match the firm dynamics estimated us-
ing our dataset of Italian manufacturing firms. The uniform distribution of  ∈ [ ]
matches the cross sectional distribution of the profits/sales ratio. The distribution
of the volatility of the shock 2 is uniform between 0 and 2 where 2 is chosen to
match the average coeﬃcient of variation of the profits/sales ratio at the firm level.
The autocorrelation coeﬃcient  matches the autocorrelation of the profits/sales ra-
tio. The fixed export cost  corresponds to a sunk cost of starting to export equal
to 25% of average yearly sales in the industry. This is in line with Das, Roberts, and
Tybout (2007), who estimate for Colombian chemical plants that export penetration
costs account for between 18.4 and 41.2 percent of the annual value of a firm’s ex-
ports. The startup cost  matches the average profitability of firms; the fixed cost
of starting production  aﬀects the selection into entry and the relation between risk
and volatility of new firms. Therefore it is chosen in order to match the diﬀerence in
the correlation between volatility and profits between constrained and unconstrained
firms.8
The variable trade cost  matches the fraction of exporting firms for which exports
account for at least 20% of total sales.9 The value of initial wealth 0 determines the
8For both the empirical and the simulated correlations we consider time series of 9 observations
for each firm.
9The threshold of 20% does not aﬀect the simulated statistics, because all simulated firms that
start exporting do indeed export a large fraction of their total production. It is instead important
for the empirical data, where some firms may export small quantities simply because they are using
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intensity of financing frictions and the probability of bankruptcy for young firms. It is
calibrated in order to match the fraction of financially constrained firms.10 Among the
parameters that we do not directly calibrate, the elasticities  and  are taken from
Melitz and Costantini (2007), and  is assumed to be perfectly correlated to 11
-table 1 about here-
Table 1 summarizes the calibrated parameters and the matched moments. The
parameter values match the chosen moments reasonably well. In particular, the sim-
ulated firms are very similar to those in the dataset concerning the level, volatility
and cross sectional dispersion of profits. Moreover in the simulated dataset on aver-
age 0.36% of firms default every period because of a binding liquidity constraint (9).
This is of a similar order of magnitude of the frequency of yearly defaults observed for
manufacturing firms (around 0.5%-1%). The simulated data are also consistent with
the stylized fact that the exit rate of firms is age dependent. The exit rate of firms in
the first year of age is 9%, in the second year is 5.5%, in the third year is 4.8% and
then it gradually converges to the constant exogenous exit rate of 4%. The simulated
data also matches well the fraction of exporting Italian firms. More than 50% of the
firms in the sample export a substantial amount of their products in our sample. On
the one hand, this empirical fact depends on two features of the Italian industry: i)
the presence of a large number of small firms specialised in producing and exporting
high quality manufactured goods; ii) the high level of trade integration of North Italy
(where are located around 90% of all the Italian manufacturing firms) with Continental
indirect channels and they did not invest the sunk cost to establish a proper presence in the foreign
markets.
10In the empirical dataset we detect on average 14% of firms that every period complain about the
lack of external finance availability. In the simulated data, for the firms that continue activity, the
only financially constrained investment is the export decision. Firms cannot borrow, and therefore in
order to be able to continue activity in period  and to start exporting in period + 1 , their wealth
 need to cover both the fixed cost  and the sunk cost  
11This perfect correlation assumption simplifies the numerical solution of the model, but it is not
essential for the results.
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Europe. On the other hand, the main results of the model still hold for alternative
calibrations with a much smaller fraction of exporting firms, as it will be shown later
in table 4.
4.1 Simulations results
Figure 2 shows the value function  ( |  2) of two representative firms with the
same productivity  but with diﬀerent risk levels 2 For simplicity we consider the
case in which the shock  is serially uncorrelated ( = 0). For this figure we chose
the minimum productivity level  such that a financially unconstrained firm finds it
optimal to start exporting. On the X axis is the value of the firm’s assets  as a
fraction of average sales in the industry. The figure also shows the export decisions
of both firms. The value function is concave in wealth for the high risk firm because,
when assets  are low, the firm is unable to finance fixed costs after a negative shock
and is forced to exit. These costs are much higher for the high risk firm. When assets
are large, the probability of "going bankrupt" disappears, and the two firms have the
same value.12
-Figure 2 about here-
Figure 2 also shows that the export decision depends on wealth. The low risk firm
does not export when its wealth is very low, because it does not have enough wealth to
pay for the export cost  even when bankruptcy is not an issue. Therefore we denote
this interval as the "binding constraint region". Conversely, the high risk firm starts
exporting only when wealth is very high. This firm faces an higher volatility of profits.
For intermediate values of wealth it would have enough resources to pay for   but
such cost would reduce  and would leave the firm much poorer and more financially
12The value function measures only the future expected profits, and it does not include also the
value of the assets represented on the X axis.
19
fragile. Thus this high risk firm prefers to wait and to accumulate more assets, for
precautionary reasons, before starting to export. Therefore the wealth interval in which
only the low risk firm exports identifies the "precautionary region". In this particular
case the value function is virtually flat for assets values in the precautionary region
because the chosen value of  implies that the net present value of starting to export
is very small for these firms.
Figure 3 compares the same low risk firm shown in figure 2 with a higher pro-
ductivity and higher volatility firm. This comparison is important, since idiosyncratic
risk and productivity are positively correlated across firms in the simulated industry
because of the selection eﬀect induced by financing frictions and entry costs. Figure 3
shows that the high productivity firm has higher value, but also that its value is more
sensitive to financial wealth. This firm also engages in precautionary saving to reduce
future financing problems, and therefore it chooses to accumulate an higher amount
of wealth than the less productive firms before starting to export. This precautionary
eﬀect is important since exporting is very profitable for this firm and the delay implies
a loss in terms of lower expected net income. This loss is reflected in the fact that the
value function for the high risk/high productivity firm is now upward sloping in the
precautionary region.
-Figure 3 about here-
This precautionary eﬀect has also important consequences for aggregate produc-
tivity. More productive firms fear bankruptcy more, because the wedge between their
expected discounted profits and their liquidation value is higher. This eﬀect is rein-
forced by the fact that more productive firms are on average more volatile; so they need
to accumulate more wealth before starting to export. In other words, the more firms in
an industry are subject to financing frictions, the more is likely that we observe a less
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productive firm which chooses to start exporting while a more productive one chooses
to wait. At the aggregate level, this reduces the beneficial eﬀect of trade liberalization
on the reallocation of production.
In order to quantify the aggregate eﬀect of financing frictions on firm dynamics after
trade liberalization we simulate several calibrated artificial industries for many periods,
and we compute their steady state statistics. We consider three diﬀerent industries: one
with perfect financial markets, and no financing frictions; one with financing frictions
but no default risk, and one with both financing frictions and default risk. These three
industries are identical in terms of all the parameters illustrated before, except the
following: in the "Financing frictions only" industry the profits shock is equal to zero,
 = 0 for any  This industry is similar to those analyzed by Manova (2008) and
Chaney (2005). Profits are not volatile, but some firms do not export because they
have insuﬃcient internal funds to finance the export cost  . In the "perfect markets"
industry instead initial wealth 0 is high enough so that no firm is ever financially
constrained in its investment decisions, regardless of its volatility 2. Therefore firm
dynamics in this industry are the same as in the standard Melitz model.
Figure 4 compares the allocation of capital in the three industries before opening up
to trade, and the selection into export after trade liberalization. The three bottom lines
refer to the distribution of productivity of firms operating in the home market, when
trade is not allowed. In the "perfect markets industry" there is a simple productivity
threshold as in the standard Melitz model. New firms that draw a productivity value
 above a certain minimum level min pay the sunk cost  and begin production,
while firms below that level do not. The industry with financing frictions and no risk
is identical to the "perfect market industry", because by construction the export cost
 is the only investment subject to financing constraints in this industry.13
13This is because, in the absence of risk, if 0 guarantees that the financing constraint (9) does not
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-Figure 4 about here-
On the contrary, in the industry with financing constraints and risk there is much
more dispersion of productivity across operating firms, which implies a lower aggregate
productivity relative to the other two industries. This result can be understood as a
combination of several eﬀects. First, there is a "selection" eﬀect. Firms that pay the
setup cost  and find out to be high risk, will pay  and start production only if
they are very productive. This generates a positive correlation between idiosyncratic
risk and productivity among operating firms, and it implies that some medium produc-
tivity firms that operate in the perfect markets industry do not operate here because
their income process is too volatile and the default risk too high. Second, there is a
"competition" eﬀect. Firms in this industry face some probability of ineﬃcient default
in the early stage of their lives. This discourages entry, reduces competition, and in-
creases expected profits until firms find it profitable again to enter. In other words, the
expected profits in the industry are upward sloping. Lower profits expected at young
age, because of the default risk, are compensated by reduced competition and higher
profits for the firms that "survive" their early age and accumulate enough wealth not
to face any default risk in the future. These higher profits are very attractive for low
risk firms, which do not face any default risk when young, because their income process
is not very volatile. Therefore some low risk/low productivity firms which do not start
production in the perfect markets industry find it profitable to start production in the
"default risk" industry. Third, there is the "exit" eﬀect. Among the high productivity
firms, there are many risky firms that exit in the first years of life because of liquidity
problems after receiving a negative shock.
Therefore figure 4 implies that the allocation of capital among firms in a closed
bind in period 1 for an home producing firm, it also guarantees that it does not bind in any future
period.
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economy is worsened by financing frictions and default risk. The remaining three "cir-
cled" lines in figure 4 represent the distribution of exporting firms when the industry
opens up to trade.14 By construction the vertical distance between the "active firms"
line and the "exporters" line measures the positive reallocation eﬀect induced by the
selection into export. The larger the distance, the more export activity is concentrated
among the more productive firms, and the more liberalizing trade promotes a reallo-
cation of production towards the more productive firms.15 Figure 4 shows that such
distance is much smaller in the financially constrained industry, showing that financing
frictions worsen the selection into export. In other words, in the presence of default
risk productivity becomes less important in determining the decision to export, and
therefore trade liberalization has a smaller impact on the reallocation of capital than
in the "perfect markets" industry.
This result is also best explained by distinguishing several eﬀects: first, there is a
direct eﬀect. Only firms that accumulate enough wealth to pay the sunk cost  may
start exporting. This eﬀect actually increases the importance of productivity for the
export decision, because more productive firms accumulate wealth faster on average.
However, the selection eﬀect and the competition eﬀect mentioned before worsen the
selection into export. According to the selection eﬀect, more productive firms are on
average more risky, and need to accumulate more financial wealth before starting to
export. According to the competition eﬀect, some low risk/low productivity firms,
which would only operate in the home market in the absence of financing frictions,
find it profitable to export in the industry with default risk, due to the higher profits
14Each industry opens up to trade in a symmetric two country world, where the foreign country
industry shares the same characteristics.
15The total eﬀect of trade liberalization on productivity is given by this reallocation eﬀect, weighted
by the number of exporting firms, and by the competition eﬀect that pushes out of production some
firms that were previously operating in the home market. This latter eﬀect is not shown in figure 4,
but is analysed more in details in tables 2-4.
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enjoyed by the firms that do not default. Figure 4 also shows that the selection into
export in the industry with "financing frictions only", where there is no default risk,
no selection eﬀect, and a very small competition eﬀect, is very similar to the selection
in the perfect markets industry.
-Figure 5 about here-
Figure 4 jointly analyze the impact of the selection and competition eﬀects on
export decision, while figures 5 and 6 focus on the former one. Figure 5 shows the
accumulation of financial assets for firms grouped according to the parameter 2 (the
volatility of profits). In the industry "with financing frictions only" firms do not go
bankrupt, and they accumulate exactly the amount of assets necessary to finance the
sunk cost to start exporting. The volatility of profits has no eﬀect on the export
decision in this industry. Conversely in the industry with default risk the higher is the
volatility of profits, the higher are average profits, because of the selection eﬀect, but
also the higher are the assets accumulated before starting to export. The diﬀerence in
the accumulation of assets between the two industries is entirely due to precautionary
saving. Figure 6 shows that such precautionary behavior significantly increases the
time necessary to start exporting for the most volatile firms. Firms that discover to
be high risk enter into production only if they are very productive, and then they wait
much longer before starting to export than the less productive and volatile firms.
-Figure 6 about here-
The implications of figures 4-6 is that the gain in aggregate productivity from
liberalizing trade may be significantly smaller in the presence of financing frictions not
because fewer firms export, but because selection into export is not eﬃcient. This
prediction of the model is quantified in table 2. In the first three columns we compare
the same three industries analyzed in figure 4. The first row shows the percentage of
24
exporting firms. In the "financing frictions only" economy 36.6% of firms export, versus
a value of 49.9% in the "perfect markets" economy. This diﬀerence is due to the firms
that cannot pay for the sunk cost  when their wealth  is too low. Conversely the
percentage of exporting firms is much higher in the "default risk" economy, being equal
to 48%. Here the direct negative eﬀect is also operational, but it is counterbalanced
by the general equilibrium eﬀect mentioned before, which has a positive eﬀect on the
probability to export. The second row of table 2 shows the gain in productivity caused
by trade liberalization. The percentage value is measured relative to the productivity
in the "default risk" industry before opening up to trade. Moreover it is standardized
so that a 100% value would imply that after trade liberalization all production is
carried out by the firms with the highest productivity in the distribution  The figure
shows that the gain in productivity is more than 30% smaller in the "Default risk"
industry with respect to the "Perfect markets" industry. This reduction is not caused
by a reduction in the number of exporting firms, which is approximately equal in the
two industries. Instead it is due to a worsening in the selection of firms into home
production, and to a worsening of the selection of firms into export. On the contrary
the reduction in productivity gains is much smaller in the "financing frictions only"
industry, despite fewer firms export here, because selection into export is as good as
in the perfect markets economy.
-Table 2 about here-
These results imply that financing frictions may significantly aﬀect firm dynamics
after a trade liberalization not simply because firms are unable to export, as it has been
suggested by the previous literature, but because they worsen the selection both into
home and into foreign markets. We show that this selection eﬀect is quantitatively
important in aﬀecting the productivity gains from trade liberalization. One possi-
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ble objection of this result is that access to foreign markets may actually reduce the
volatility of profit by diversifying the revenues shocks (see Campa and Shaver 2001).
We consider this possibility in the fourth column of table 2, which assumes that rev-
enues from export are not subject to uncertainty ( = 0 always). Therefore exporting
reduces the volatility of profits in relative terms, and this reduction is larger the riskier
a firm is. This is of course an extreme example, because in reality it is plausible to
assume that  and  have a certain degree of positive correlation. Nonetheless table
2 shows that, even when export is not risky, the default risk substantially reduces the
increase in average productivity caused by trade liberalization. This is because the
competition eﬀect described before is still present, since it is determined by the risk
of entering in the home production. Moreover the selection eﬀect becomes less strong,
but it does not disappear completely.
4.2 Sensitivity analysis
Tables 3 and 4 analyze the robustness of the results illustrated in the previous sections
for diﬀerent calibrations.
-Table 3 about here-
Table 3 shows industry dynamics in the "default risk" industry with alternative
calibrations of the volatility parameter 2 the initial wealth 0 and the persistency pa-
rameter  These three parameters aﬀect the wealth distribution, and change industry
dynamics only in the industry with financing frictions, because wealth is irrelevant for
the production decisions of firms in the perfect markets industry. Among the results
shown in table 3, it is worth noting that the general result of a smaller increase in
productivity holds across all the specifications. However, when financing frictions are
less strong because volatility of profits is smaller (2 = 05) or because initial wealth is
larger (0 = 032) then the worse reallocation of capital is almost entirely due to the
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worse selection into export market. This reallocation is particularly ineﬃcient when
persistency is high. A value of  = 08 which is not implausible, given that it gener-
ates an autocorrelation of the profits sales ratio around 0.4, implies that selection into
export generates an increase in productivity as little as 3.1%.
-Table 4 about here-
Table 4 analyses how the results vary for diﬀerent values of the sunk cost  of
starting to export It shows that both the percentage of exporting firms and the in-
crease in productivity are very sensitive to  in the perfect markets economy, as
originally emphasizes by Melitz (2003). Conversely in the default risk economy we see
two important diﬀerences. First, the selection and competition eﬀects makes the per-
centage of exporting firms less sensitive to   Indeed when  is high the percentage
of exporting firms is higher in the industry with financing frictions than in the perfect
markets one. Second, the increase in productivity is almost insensitive to changes is
  because when  is low and many firms export the selection into export becomes
relatively worse, and is not compensated by a larger increase in the selection into home
production.
5 Empirical Evidence
There are four main predictions of the model that are tested throughout this section:
Prediction 1: Productivity and the volatility of productivity should be correlated and
this correlation is higher for financially constrained firms.
Prediction 2: Financing constraints should aﬀect the decision of becoming an ex-
porter even after controlling for productivity.
The reason is that financing constraints aﬀect the ability of the firm to pay the
fixed costs of exporting and therefore even if financing constraints are not caused by
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productivity they should still matter in determining the firm’s exporting behavior.
Prediction 3: Financially constrained firms should hoard liquidity around the mo-
ment when they become exporters, for precautionary reasons.
While financially unconstrained firms can borrow to pay for the large initial fixed
costs of exporting, financially constrained firms will accumulate enough liquid assets
so that even after paying for the initial export costs they will have enough resources
to face future demand shocks in both the home and the export market. Furthermore,
productivity aﬀects this precautionary liquidity hoarding in two ways: it tends to reduce
it because more productive firms expect on average to accumulate wealth faster once
they start exporting. But also it tends to increase it because productive firms are also
riskier, and hence need more liquidity to absorb bigger shocks. If the second eﬀect
prevails (as it does in the calibrated simulated industries analyzed in the previous
section), then the liquidity hoarding should be stronger for more productive firms.
Prediction 4: The eﬀect of the firm’s individual productivity on the likelihood of
being an exporter should be smaller the higher the financing constraints.
While in an unconstrained industry a strict threshold of productivity should deter-
mine whether a firm exports or not, this threshold gets blurred the moment financing
constraints appear. On the one hand some high risk/high productivity firms prefer to
delay the export decision, on the other hand some low productivity/low risk firms are
more likely to continue operating in both the home and foreign market. The intuition
for this result is captured in figures 3 and 4.
5.1 Data Description
To test the empirical predictions of the model we use the dataset of the Mediocredito
Centrale surveys. The dataset contains a representative sample of Small and Medium
Italian manufacturing firms. It is an incomplete panel with two main sources of infor-
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mation gathered in two diﬀerent surveys:
i) Balance sheet data and profit and loss statements from 1995 to 2003 at a year
level (index ).
ii) Qualitative information from three surveys conducted in 1997, 2000, 2003. Each
survey (indexed ) reports information about the activity of the firm in the three pre-
vious years and in particular, it includes detailed information on exports and financing
constraints.
Each survey is conducted on a representative sample of the population of small and
medium manufacturing firms (smaller than 500 employees). The samples are selected
balancing the criterion of representativeness with the one of continuity. The firms in
each survey contain three consecutive years of data. After the third year 2/3 of the
sample is replaced and the new sample is then kept for the three following years.
This dataset is particularly well suited for our analysis. It contains firm-level de-
tailed information about financing constraints, information about the exporting be-
havior of the firm and standard accounting data. Once we restrict ourselves to the
observations with valid information the relevant variables the dataset contains 6966
firms and 31939 firm-year observations.
The firm-level variables about international trade that we use in the analysis are: A
dummy variable that measures whether the firm exports part of its production (export
dummy), the % of sales exported (% sales exported ) and the number of regions to
which the firm exports out of a maximum of 8 diﬀerent international regions (number
of regions).16 17
16The regions are EU, Africa, Asia, China, USA-Canada, Central and South America, Oceania,
Other.
17In most of the regressions throughout the paper there is not enough within firm variation to justify
the use of fixed eﬀects regressions. The reasons for this are that 2/3 of the sample is replaced in each
3 year wave, that some variables do not change buy construction throughout the 3 years window and
that there is substantial persistence in both trade and financing constraints variables.
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As our main measure of financing constraints we consider the questions in the
Survey where each firm is asked:
i) Whether it had a loan application turned down recently.
ii) Whether it desires more credit at the market interest rate.
iii) Whether it would be willing to pay an higher interest rate than the market rate
in order to obtain credit.
We use this information to construct our main measure of financing constraints
constrained  which takes value 1 for period  if firm  answers yes to any of the
questions (i) to (iii) and takes value zero otherwise. According to this measure 14% of
the firms declare to be financially constrained. This is a much more reliable measure
of financing constraints than measures based on balance sheet information or financial
outcomes. However a possible concern is that this variable could be correlated with
productivity shocks which are likely determinants of trade outcomes. For this reason
we use an instrumental variables approach using as IVs variables that are unlikely to
be correlated with productivity shocks.
In all the regressions we introduce as controls the size of the firm measured as
the log of its real total assets (Log real total assets), the age of the firm in years
(Age (years)) and age squared (Age squared ) and the productivity level of the firm
(TFP ). Productivity is measured as the residual from a regression model in which
total production is explained by a translog specification of a Cobb Douglas production
model that includes fixed capital and total employment. The coeﬃcients of the model
are allowed to vary at a 2 digit-sector level and on 3 year windows.18 This measure
of productivity is quite standard in the empirical literature. Furthermore, Crino and
Epifani (2010) use the Mediocredito dataset to study how firm and foreign market
18In particular productivity is measured by  in the following model () =P
=1
P
=1  log() +  log() +  log() ∗ log() +  +  + 
w where  referes to 2 digit sector levels,  to 3 year intervals and  to the years 1995 to 2003.
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characteristics aﬀect the geographic distribution of exporters’ sales. They calculate
several measures of total factor productivity and show that the results based on a
Cobb-Douglas translog specification are similar to the results based on alternative
measures of productivity, such as a Cobb-Douglas specification with the semiparametric
estimators proposed by Olley and Pakes (OP, 1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003).
Furthermore, it is important to note that our theoretical model is very stylized, and
not entirely consistent with using a standard TFP measure as a proxy of productivity.
We pick this particular measure for consistency and comparability with the existing
literature. The results are however robust to using a productivity measure based on
gross profits (sales minus variable costs) which is entirely consistent with the model.
5.2 Identification strategy
Both exports and financing constraints are likely to be correlated with the levels of
productivity of the firm. Given that our productivity measure is an imperfect proxy
for true productivity it would be possible that the measure of financing constraints
would be partially capturing the eﬀect of productivity. That is, if productivity is
correlated with exports and our productivity proxy measures it with error, the financing
constraints measure may also be proxying for productivity. For this reason we need
to instrument our financing constraints measure with instrumental variables that are
uncorrelated with productivity shocks and unlikely to aﬀect exports through channels
other than financing constraints.
We use a set of instrumental variables similar to the ones used in Caggese and
Cuñat (2008). A first approach uses as instrumental variable that measures the level
of financial development at a regional level (Financ. Dev ). This variable is calculated
in Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2004) and it measures the likelihood that a consumer
bank loan is denied in diﬀerent Italian regions. The measured is “inverted” and nor-
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malized, so that a value of zero indicates the highest probability of denial and that the
maximum possible value is 0.56. While this variable is uncorrelated with temporary
liquidity shocks that the firm may have, it is possible that, cross sectionally, it is cor-
related with variables that jointly determine financing constraints and the propensity
to export. For this reason we use a second set of instruments that are based on the
relationship lending literature. These variables are the share the main lending bank
has over the total loans of the firm (Percentage loans with main bank ), the number
of years that the firm has been operating with this bank (length of main bank relation-
ship) and the square of this same variable (length of main bank relationship squared ).
This set of instruments is referred to as Rel lending IV in the regressions.
Table 5 justifies the validity of these variables as instruments of financing constraints
and shows the first stage of the IV regressions.
-table 5 about here-
In column 1 we pool all four variables and add some balance sheet variables that are
correlated with financing constraints. These are the leverage ratio of the firm (Leverage
ratio), its net financial assets over total assets (Liquidity ratio) and the coverage ratio
(Coverage ratio). This is a form of validation of our measure of financial constraints
that is correlated with balance sheet measures of constraints. With respect to the
instrumental variables, the table shows that higher financial development reduces the
likelihood of being financially constrained. A larger share of loans with the main bank
is however related to higher financing constraints. This has been identified in the
relationship lending literature as a consequence of higher monopoly power of the bank.
Longer relationship with the main bank reduces the likelihood of being financially
constrained in a convex way. Columns 2 and 3 show the first stage regressions of the
two sets of instrumental variables.
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5.3 Results
In Table 6 we verify the first prediction of the model, showing the relationship be-
tween firm productivity and its volatility. The measure of firm productivity is the TFP
variable described in section 5.1. The measure of volatility in columns 1 to 3 is the
firm-level standard deviation of this same measure and we interact it with dummies
that correspond to the firms in the top and middle third of predicted financing con-
straints according to the first stage regression in Table 6 column 3 (i.e. using the
instruments share main bank yearsbank years2). More specifically, we first pre-
dict the variable everconstrained using our instrumental variables. The variable is
averaged at a firm level and used to generate three dummy variables ,
, and  that split the sample in roughly three equal
parts (with  being the omitted variable in the regressions) according
to the predicted financing constraints of the firm. The variables are then interacted with
the volatility of the productivity of the firm. The correlation between the predicted
financing constraints and the productivity measure is 0.009. This is not surprising,
given the way that they are constructed but it is important to emphasize it, as the
interacted variables should represent comparable populations of firms in terms of pro-
ductivity but with diﬀerent levels of financing constraints. Column 3 includes controls
for log assets, age, age squared, year, sector and regional dummies.
-table6 about here-
The results in columns 1 to 3 show that indeed, productivity is correlated with its
volatility and that this correlation is higher for those firms that are more constrained.
In columns 4 to 6 we replicate the analysis but using the standard deviation of pro-
ductivity divided by log net sales to measure volatility. This alternative measure is
a unit independent measure of volatility and therefore less sensitive to the influence
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of the size of firms in determining volatility.19 This is a much more strict test of the
correlation between productivity and its volatility and, in fact, the model does not
predict that this ratio is necessarily growing on productivity; this is only the case when
selection into entry is quite strong. The results are however quite similar to the ones in
columns 1 and 2 showing that the volatility of productivity is positively correlated with
productivity but that the eﬀect is mainly coming from financially constrained firms.
Table 7 verifies the second prediction of the model, showing the basic results of the
influence of financing constraints on the exporting policies of firms. The main control
variables replicate some of the results already present in the literature. Larger sizes and
higher productivity levels are associated with a higher likelihood of exporting, higher
proportion of exports and more destination regions. Age is also positively correlated
with the likelihood of being an exporter in general and in particular markets; however
age does not seem to have much impact on the intensive margin of exports.
-table 7 about here-
The main results of this table are the ones on the financing constraints variable.
Constrained firms are less likely to export when financing constraints are instrumented
(columns 2 and 3). This is an important result. Even after controlling for productivity,
size, age, sector and year eﬀects, financing constraints still retain power in explaining
exports. This eﬀect is unlikely to be the result of financing constraints capturing a
productivity residual, given the nature of our instrumental variables.20 Interestingly,
financing constraints do not seem to aﬀect the percentage of sales exported (columns
19Note that an alternative unit-independent measure is the coeﬃcient of variation of TFP (i.e.
sdTFP/meanTFP), but given that the average TFP is by construction zero at a sector-period level,
the coeﬃcient of variation leads to frequent outliers in this case.
20The results are consistent with Manova (2008) and Muûls and Pisu (2009) that show that measures
of financing constraints based on balance sheed and sector data are negatively correlated with exports.
However a general theme in both papers is that financing constraints are largely determined by
productivity. From an identification point of view, it is diﬃcult to disentangle what part of their
results is due to direct or indirect eﬀects of productivity. Our instrumental variables approach is
unlikely to be capturing productivity eﬀects on the constraints measure.
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4 to 6). This is consistent with the idea that financing constraints are relevant for the
fixed costs of exporting, but less relevant on the intensive margin, where the exported
goods can serve as collateral and international trade credit is generally available.21
Importantly, it is also consistent with the prediction of the model that firms start to
export only after they accumulated some financial assets for precautionary reasons,
in order to reduce future financing problems. Finally (in columns 7 to 9), financing
constraints also aﬀect negatively the number of international regions to which the firm
exports. This last eﬀect seems quite strong and may be related to the existence of
fixed exporting costs that are region-specific (e.g. having a firm representative in each
region or adapting goods to regional tastes).
The next set of results verify the third prediction of the model by showing the
evolution of liquidity when firms become exporters. In table 8 the dependent variable
is a measure of liquidity constructed as total cash and liquid assets over total assets
(liquidity ). We then identify the 4 years prior and including the moment in which the
firm went from being a non exporting firm to start exporting and construct a dummy
variable (start exporting ) that takes value 1 for these years and zero otherwise.
-table 8 about here-
Column 1 of Table 8 shows the results of a basic regression. Larger, older and
exporting firms tend to have lower liquidity levels. Around the event of becoming
exporters firms seem to have lower liquidity levels. To test the prediction of the model
that financially constrained firms should hoard liquidity when they start exporting,
we split the sample into those firms with high expected financing constraints (above
average) and those with low expected constraints. Expected financing constraints are
21Minetti and Chun Zhu (2010) use a subset of our dataset and find some impact of financing
constraints on the log of total exports. This is a related measure of intensive margin of exports, the
main diﬀerence being that our measure is unaﬀected by the size of the firm.
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constructed using a regression that uses our second set of IVs. That is, we use our
measure of predicted financing constraints, where the predictors are the relationship
lending variables (share main bank yearsbank years2 ). The results of these two
regressions can be seen in columns 2 and 3 of Table 8. The set of firms that are more
financially constrained do actually hoard liquidity around the export event, with respect
to the set of firms that are unconstrained that reduce their levels of liquidity. Both
the behavior of constrained and unconstrained firms is consistent with the predictions
of the model. Furthermore, in columns 4 to 6 we add a dummy variable that takes
value one when firms’ productivity is above their sector average and zero otherwise.
Column 4 shows that more productive firms tend to accumulate more liquidity around
the export event. Importantly, Columns 5 and 6 imply that this liquidity hoarding of
more productive firms around the time they start to export is entirely driven by the
most constrained firms in the sample, as predicted in the model.
The next set of regressions aims to test one of the main predictions of the model.
In a standard Melitz model there is a sharp distinction between exporting and non
exporting firms in terms of productivity. However, in our model, the presence of
financing constraints blurs this relationship. As seen in Section 4, a regression of the
export status of the firm on its productivity should have lower coeﬃcients as financing
constraints become more intense. Furthermore, the higher the intensity of financing
constraints the lower the predictive power of firm productivity on exports. To test this
prediction we use the predicted  variable as in table 6 to generate dummy
variables ,  accounting for the top and middle third
of firms in terms of predicted financing constraints. We run regressions in which the
export status variables are regressed against the interacted variables, the raw dummies
and the same set of controls used throughout the paper.
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-Table 9 about here-
The results can be seen in Table 9. As shown in column 1, the coeﬃcient of
productivity on the export status of the firm becomes smaller as financing constraints
become tighter starting with a positive coeﬃcient and ending with an insignificant one
for the most constrained firms (i.e. the composition of the coeﬃcients of TFP and
highconstrained x TFP). Columns 2 shows the same pattern but in this case it applies
to the percentage of sales devoted to exports. Productivity seems to be an important
determinant of the percentage of exports for firms with good access to credit. However
it seems to have no eﬀect on those firm with mild or severe financing constraints.
Column 3 shows the results with respect to the number of regions to which the firm
exports. The results in columns 3 show again that the eﬀect of productivity on exports
decreases with financing constraints.
These empirical results, together with the theoretical results shown before, prove
that the presence of financing constraints increases the heterogeneity in terms of pro-
ductivity within exporting and non-exporting firms. In turn, the diﬀerences between
a representative exporting and a representative non-exporting firm are reduced. Fi-
nancing constraints can therefore help to explain the relatively low diﬀerences in size
between exporting and non-exporting firms, which cannot be easily explained by the
standard Melitz model.
6 Conclusions
We present and test empirically a model in which firms face constraints in financ-
ing their fixed operational costs and the one-oﬀ costs associated with becoming an
exporter. The capital structure and the financial constraints faced by the firms are
determined endogenously, given the investment decisions of the firms and their idio-
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syncratic demand shocks. Financially constrained firms, which would become exporters
in an unconstrained model, may postpone the decision to export in foreign markets
because the fixed costs associated to export may increase their bankruptcy risk. This
mechanism operates even when financing constraints are not currently binding. Higher
productivity has two eﬀects on this decision. On the one hand it makes becoming
an exporter more profitable, as in standard firm models following Melitz (2003). On
the other hand, more productive firms are also on average riskier, and face an higher
probability of bankruptcy after they pay the fixed costs of exporting. From a purely
theoretical point of view the composition of these two eﬀects is ambiguous, however
a calibrated model shows that the second eﬀect dominates and that financially con-
strained firms accumulate more financial wealth before starting to export when they
are more productive. This eﬀect is also present in the empirical part of the paper.
Financially constrained firms hoard more liquidity around the event of becoming an
exporter. More productive firms hold in general less liquidity around it but this eﬀect
is not present for financially constrained ones.
The model shows that, in equilibrium, financing frictions reduce the aggregate
productivity gains induced by trade liberalization. This happens not because fewer
firms export, but because the selection into export is severely distorted by the presence
of financing frictions. Even though more productive firms will tend to be the ones
who export in the long run, the productivity threshold between exporting and non-
exporting firms gets blurred in the short-run when firms are financially constrained. As
a consequence, the predictive power of productivity in terms of determining exports gets
reduced whenever a substantial amount of firms faces financial constraints. This is also
confirmed empirically. In the first generation of models of firm-level export decisions
productivity tends to be the sole determinant of firms’ exporting policies. This normally
leads to very stark size diﬀerences between exporting and non-exporting firms that is
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not supported by the empirical facts. One way to reconcile these results is to introduce
some heterogeneity across firms in fixed or variable costs (Armenter and Koren, 2009).
This model contributes to this debate by showing that financing constraints increase
the heterogeneity within exporting and non-exporting firms in terms of productivity,
thus making the size diﬀerence between exporters and non-exporters smaller.
Finally, two important policy implications can be drawn from this paper. First, if
an aggregate financial shock hits, leading to lower access to credit for all firms, this will
aﬀect the composition of exporting and non-exporting firms in the future. In particular
the positive eﬀects of trade in terms of allocating production to the most productive set
of firms will be attenuated whenever access to credit is scarce. Second, when a country
opens up to trade, the eﬀects will be most beneficial in those sectors with better access
to financial markets. Those with poor access will not be able to take advantage of the
opening to trade and may in fact face higher risk of bankruptcy.
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8 Appendix I
In order to obtain a numerical solution for the value functions   (  |  2  ) and
  (  |  2  )  we consider values of  in the interval between 0 and  where
 is a suﬃciently high level of assets such that the firm is never financially constrained
now or in the future. We then discretise this interval in a grid of 800 points. The
shock  is modeled as a two state symmetric Markov process. the supports [ ] and
[0 2] are discretized in grids of 61 points and 12 points respectively. We make several
experiments with these grid dimensions to be sure that these values are large enough
so that the choice of the grid does not significantly influence the quantitative results
of the simulations.
We first make an initial guess of the equilibrium aggregate price  Based on this
guess we calculate the optimal value of   (  |  2  ) using an iterative procedure.
We then apply the zero profits condition (13) and we update the guess of  accordingly.
We repeat this procedure until the solution converges to the equilibrium. Then we
simulate an artificial industry where every period the total number of new entrants
ensures that condition (1) is satisfied.
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9 Figures and Tables
Figure 2: Value (left scale) and decision to export (right scale) of firms with same
productivity and diﬀerent risk levels
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Figure 3: Comparison between a low productivity/low risk and a high productivity
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Figure 4: Percentage of firms over productivity levels
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Figure 5: Precautionary saving for firms with diﬀerent volatility of profits
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Figure 6: Average age of firms that start to export
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Table 1: Calibration
Matched parameters
Value Moment to match Data
Baseline
simulation
 2010 number of firms 13.000 13.000
 0.04 Average age of firms 25 25
 1.02 average real interest rate 2% 2%
 14%* average ratio fixed costs/labour costs 0.20 0.20
 25%* Cost of starting to export 20-40% 25%
 [0.862;0.895] cross sectional volatility of  0.018 0.023
2 0.6 avg. coeﬀ. of var. of  (time series) 1.07 1.03 0.4 Autocorrelation of  0.21 0.20 7%* average of  0.059 0.061
 42%* diﬀerence in corr(sd() mean()) 0.15 0.1
 1.05 fraction of firms exporting ≥ 20% sales 50% 48%
0 27%* fraction of financially constrained firms 14%** 21%***
Other parameters
 1.5 From Costantini and Melitz (2007)
 4 From Costantini and Melitz (2007)
 same as 
 Perfectly correlated to 
Other moments
fraction of firms going bankrupt 0.5-1% 0.36%
** Firms that declare financing problems.
*** Firms with not enough financial wealth to start exporting (   + )
Table 2: Increase in productivity after a trade liberalisation, in diﬀerent industries
Perfect
markets
Financing
frictions
F.frict. and
Default risk
F.frictions
Def. risk, but
"safe exports"1
% of exporting firms 49.9% 36.6% 48% 48.2%
% change in avg. prod.2 32.6% 27.9% 20.5% 21.9%
Composition
Selection into home market 18.7% 16.6% 11.9% 10.6%
Selection into export 13.9% 14.0%3 8.8%3 11.2%3
correct for % of export firms 0 -2.7%4 -0.2%4 -0.3%4
1 In this industry export is not risky, because  = 0 for any 
2 Computed as a % of the maximum reallocation possible. 100% would imply that after trade liberalization
all the production is carried out by the firms with the highest productivity 
3 This value measures the increase in average productivity that would be caused by the selection into export
if there were as many exporting firms as in the "perfect markets" industry
4 This value measures the increase in average productivity that is indirectly caused by the percentage of
exporting firms relative to the "perfect markets" industry
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Table 3: Increase in productivity after a trade liberalisation: sensitivity analysis for
the parameters aﬀecting wealth distribution
Perfect
markets
Default
risk
Base∗∗ 2 0 
05 07 0.22 0.32 0 0.8
% exporting 49.9% 48% 43% 50% 49% 46% 42% 52%
% increase prod.* 32.6% 20.5% 26.7% 15.3% 17% 23% 23% 17.1%
Selection home 18.7% 11.9% 17.5% 6.7% 7.8% 14% 12.6% 14%
Select. export 13.9% 8.8% 9.2% 8.7% 9.3% 9.3% 10% 3.1%
% exporting 0 -0.2% -1.1% -0.01% -0.2% -0.5% -1.2% 0.01%
*computed as a % of the maximum reallocation possible. 100% would imply that after trade
liberalization all the production is carried out by the firms with the highest productivity 
∗∗ Base calibration: 2 = 06; 0 = 27;  = 04
Table 4: Increase in productivity after a trade liberalisation: sensitivity analysis to the
cost of starting to export
 = 016  = 02(base cal.)  = 024
perfect
markets
default
risk
perfect
markets
default
risk
perfect
markets
default
risk
% exporting 79% 62% 49.9% 48% 22% 33%
% increase prod.* 34% 20% 32.6% 20.5% 25% 18.3%
Selection home 27.7% 17.3% 18.7% 11.9% 12.3% 6.0%
Select. export 6.8% 3.2% 13.9% 8.8% 12.7% 8.9%
% exporting 0% -0.5% 0% -0.2% 0% 3.4%
*computed as a % of the maximum reallocation possible. 100% would imply that after trade
liberalisation all the production is carried out by the firms with the highest productivity 
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Table 5: Constraints variable and first stages
Financial Dev. IV shows the first stage of an instrumental variable regression for Constrained (Table 3)
using as instrument a measure of financial development as in Guiso, Sapienza, Zingales (2004), Relationship
Lending IV corresponds to a first-stage regression that uses as IVs for Constrained (Table 3) the length of
the relationship with the bank, length of the relationship squared, and percentage of loans with main bank.
The control variables included in the second stage are the age of the firm in years and age squared, the log
of real total assets, year dummies, regional dummies (nort east, north west, center, south) and two digit
level sector dummies. Other variables included in column 1 are the leverage ratio (debt over total assets),
the liquidity ratio (cash and liquid assets over total assets) and the coverage ratio (profits before interest
and taxes minus interest over profits). Standard errors in brackets. ***, **, * denote significance at a 1%,
5% and 10% level respectively.
1 2 3
Justify Financial Dev IV Rel Lending IV
Financial Development -0.0025*** -0.0025***
[0.00015] [0.00013]
Percentage loans with main bank 0.0008*** 0.00081***
[0.00009] [0.000080]
Length of main bank’s relationship (years) -0.0030*** -0.0043***
[0.00046] [0.00040]
Length of main bank’s relationship squared 0.00005*** 0.000069***
[0.000008] [0.000007]
Age (years) 0.00040* -0.00053*** -0.00032
[0.00023] [0.00019] [0.00021]
Age squared -0.000004* 0.000003** 0.000001
[0.000002] [0.000002] [0.000002]
Log Real Total Assets -0.014*** -0.0137*** -0.0127***
[0.0017] [0.0014] [0.0014]
Leverage ratio 0.271***
[0.012]
Liquidity ratio -0.052***
[0.0067]
Coverage ratio -0.000037
[0.000031]
Observations 28821 37917 37917
R-squared 0.07 0.03 0.02
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Table 6: Entry decision
TFP is total factor productivity, measured as the residual of a translog specification that uses capital and employment
and is estimated at a 2 digit Ateco sector level on 3 year windows. sdTFP corresponds to the standard deviation
of the TFP measure calculated at a 2 digit sector-year level. sdTFP/logsales corresponds to sdTFP divided by the
average log sales calculated at a 2 digit sector-year level. Midconstrained is a dummy for the middle third quantile
of the predicted financing constrained firms using the relationship lending instrumental variables as in Table 2.
Similarly Highconstrained is a dummy variable for the top third quantile of predicted financing constraints. Controls
in columns 3 and 6 include the log of real total assets, age, age squared, year dummies, 2 digit sector dummies and
regional dummies. Standard errors in brackets. ***, **. * denote significance at a 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
1 2 3 4 5 6
sdTFP sdTFP/log sales
TFP 0.0123*** -0.0051*** 0.0071*** 0.00105*** -0.001*** -0.001***
[0.00097] [0.0019] [0.0015] [0.00010] [0.000] [0.000]
Midconstrained x TFP 0.016*** 0.0040** 0.003*** 0.002***
[0.0026] [0.0019] [0.000] [0.000]
Highconstrained x TFP 0.029*** 0.011*** 0.004*** 0.003***
[0.0025] [0.0019] [0.000] [0.000]
Controls No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 33455 33455 33455 33455 33455 33455
R-squared 0.00 0.01 0.44 0.003 0.009 0.031
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Table 7: Financing constraints and export decision
Instrumental variables for Constrained are defined as in Table 1. The control variables included in the second stage are the age
of the firm in years and age squared, the log of real total assets, year dummies, regional dummies (nort east, north west, center,
south) and two digit level sector dummies. Standard errors in brackets. ***, **, * denote significance at a 1%, 5% and 10%
level respectively.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Export Dummy % Sales Exported Number of Regions
OLS IV IV OLS IV IV OLS IV IV
Financ. Dev Rel Lend. Financ. Dev Rel Lend. Financ. Dev Rel Lend.
Log Real Total Assets 086*** 081*** 083*** 3.066*** 3.057*** 3.166*** 358*** 347*** 353***
[0022] [0029] [0027] [199] [241] [225] [0082] [010] [0095]
TFP 048*** 038*** 0354*** 2.755*** 3.696*** 3.220*** 071*** 074** 053**
[0046] [0084] [0068] [420] [776] [628] [017] [029] [024]
Constrained 0070 -281* -288** 707 12.230 10.743 -062** -379 -468
[0067] [155] [113] [637] [13.975] [1038485] [024] [535] [400]
Age (years) .0012*** 00098*** 00095*** -0167 -0065 -010705 0068*** 0067*** 006***
[00027] [00031] [00030] [024] [025] [024819] [0010] [0010] [0011]
Age squared -.000005** -000003 -000003 -00021 -00029 -00026 -00003*** -00003*** -00003***
[.000002] [000003] [000003] [00019] [00021] [000207] [000009] [000009] [000009]
Observations 29173 29173 29173 15593 15593 15593 29334 29334 29334
R-squared 17 11 11 14 12 13 18 17 17
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Table 8: Becoming an exporter and liquidity
Export is a dummy variable that takes value one if the firm is exporting. Start Exportingt is a dumy variable that takes
value one on the four years prior and up to the moment when the firmsl becomes an exporter. Columns 2-3 and 5-6
correspond to nested regressions in which all the independent variables are interacted with dummies associated with the
firm being above or below median predicted financing constraints. Predicted financing constraints are calculated using
the relationship lending variables as in table 1. TFP is total factor productivity, measured as the residual of a translog
specification that uses capital and employment and is estimated at a 2 digit Ateco sector level on 3 year windows. All
regressions include as control variables year dummies and two digit level sector dummies. Standard errors in brackets. ***,
* , * denote significance at a 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
1 2 3 4 5 6
Nested Regression Nested Regression
all constrained unconstr. all constrained unconstr.
TFP x Productive -0.008* -0.039*** 0.042***
[0.004] [0.005] [0.005]
Start Export.xProductive 0.037** 0.060*** 0.046
[0.018] [0.019] [0.064]
Export -0.040*** -0.062*** -0.015*** -0.041*** -0.067*** -0.017***
[0.004] [0.0051] [0.005] [0.004] [0.006] [0.005]
Start Exporting -0.033*** -0.014 -0.068*** -0.058*** -0.053*** -0.118***
[0.008] [0.008] [0.017] [0.014] [0.015] [0.040]
Log real total assets -0.084*** -0.060*** -0.063*** -0.083*** -0.057*** -0.073***
[0.0014] [0.0018] [0.003] [0.0016] [0.002] [0.0036]
Age (years) -0.001*** -0.003*** 0.002*** -0.001*** -0.003*** 0.002***
[0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.00020] [0.0002] [0.0002]
Age squared 0.000008*** 0.00003*** -0.00002*** 0.000008*** 0.00002*** -0.00002***
[0.000002] [0.000002] [0.000002] [0.000002] [0.000003] [0.000002]
Observations 29080 29080 24711 24711
R-squared 0.18 0.19 0.18 0.20
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Table 9: Predictive power of productivity on exports by level of predicted constraints
TFP is total factor productivity, measured as the residual of a translog specification that uses
capital and employment and is estimated at a 2 digit Ateco sector level on 3 year windows.
Highconstrained and Midconstrained correspond to firms on the top third and middle third of the
predicted financing constraints variable respectively. Predicted financing constraints are calculated
using the relationship lending variables as in table 1. All regressions include as control variables
year dummies and two digit level sector dummies. Standard errors in brackets. ***, **, * denote
significance at a 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
(1) (5) (9)
export all regions
Log real total assets 0.062*** 2.443*** 0.309***
[0.0036] [0.288] [0.012]
TFP 0.110*** 4.683*** 0.111***
[0.0094] [0.971] [0.032]
Midconstrained x TFP -0.039*** 0.526 0.059
[0.012] [1.179] [0.041]
Highconstrained x TFP -0.134*** -4.508*** -0.158***
[0.012] [1.124] [0.041]
Age (years) 0.00086*** -0.020 0.0063***
[0.00029] [0.024] [0.0010]
Age squared -0.000004 -0.00020 -0.000030***
[0.000003] [0.00020] [0.000009]
Observations 29334 15593 29334
R-squared 0.16 0.14 0.18
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